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DEFENCE SN:NDING IN STAGNATING ECONOMIES(*) 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a privilege for a largely academic professor of economics -from a 
small northern country to be invited - notwithstanding my lack of experience 
in defence issues - to speak here. And particulary to . do so before this dis-
tinguished audience which represents an importarÍt group of Portuguese 
democracy. 
Frankas·I can be with this expert group,. I hasten to add that defence is 
not a very popular field of study among fellow economists outside the United 
States. Actually, I have not been abIe -to find even one i!l-depth article pu-
blished on this subject in the past decades by economists in my own country. 
This may very well change in the near future. N ot because of academic 
considerations but beca use foreign policy and defence. policy are becoming 
more intertwined with economics than has ever been the case before. 
Soon, economists intere:-ted in actual economic policy and its constraints 
will have to concIude that foreign policy inthe traditionaI sense, like defence 
policy, is increasingly irrelevant in discussing nations' relations with each 
other. The rights and wrongs of the debate, of which there must be plenty 
on both sides, are Iess important than the sort of world they reflect. That 
world is that foreign policy, defence policy and intcrnationaleconomic policy 
are now equally important components of securitypolicy. E. g., .lhe tradi-
tional ideological and strategic orientation of foreign policy has already given 
way before economic interests. In recent years, farmers in the United States 
desperately want to increase trade with the Soviets. European 'farmers ~ay 
the same. And, international banks, multinational companies and global 
traders now effectively create their own foreign policies. AlI this in turn 
will have an, as yet immeasurable, impact on defence policies and defence 
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budgets. Economists will surely be intrigued by that, at least that is what 
I would hope for the quality of the debates on security policies in demo-
cratic nations. 
Mr. Chairman, let me indicate briefly which three questions I plan to 
discuss here. 
First, some general remarks about the interrelationship of economics 
and national security. Second, 1'11 discuss the Three Per Cent Solution and 
burden-sharing. Third· and last, 1'11 address some aspects of the consequences 
of the present recession for defence. 
ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
In almast any debate about foreign and defence policies, there is one 
element upon which protagonists can usua11y agree: that economic con-
siderations play a major rôle in shaping the substance of those policies. 
However, it is worthwhile to point out that some of the currently popular 
views about the interconnections between economics and national security 
are either misleading or wrong. 
An example: military strength - measured in physical outputs - does 
not depend, to any significant degree, on the rate of growth in our economies, 
at least within the range of variations which is likely to occur in the fore-
seeable future. Conversely, the leveI and the rate of growth of national income 
and employment are in no fundamental way dependent on the maintenance 
of heavy military spending. 
It seems to me that the national security of democracies far more than 
ever before in history depends upon the way in which we conduct our eco-
nomic relationships with otber nations. In turn, the state of our domestic 
economics strongly influences how those relationships are handled. And it 
is through this chain of influence that economic and security policies are 
strongly linked. 
Does the national security of democracies depend on maintaining a 
healthy rate o'f grawth in our ecanomy - is it solely dependent on our eco-
nornk strength? Surprisingly, perhaps, my answer to that questión is negative. 
Obviously, it would be impossible for industrialized democracies to keep 
our military strength if we had the GNP of developing countries. But within 
the range of likely possibilities for econornic development over the next ten 
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years, our economic ,strength wiU not ,really make much difference in our 
capabiEty to sustain the military spending which is now foreseen, unless we 
Ptlt far more emphasis on non-nuclear defence spending. 
, At thepresent time, the United States spends almost 6 per cent of its 
grgss national producton defence while collectively the NATO allies average 
about 3.5 per cent and Japan only 1 per cento In the Soviet Union the build-
-up of military power takes a heavier toll of the stagnating economy. Figures 
publisbed by the Ainerican Defense Intelligence Agency suggest that defence 
is now eating up 14-16 per cent of Soviet GNP, up from 12-14 per cent in 
the 1970s. 
The faster GNP grows, the smaller will be the fraction of it consumed 
by a given defence budget. In a slowly growing economy a larger proportion 
of our national income would have to be taken in taxes, or other government 
revenues or be financed through a higher budget deficit to support the de-
{ence budget. And this is certainly so in a stagnating economy. Butthese 
differences are surely not criticaI. At present we can clearly afford the appro-
priate':defence burden at Iower leveIs of GNP growth than experienced in 
the 1960s or 1970s. 
However, of course securing national economic prosperity and a retum 
to healthy growth are exceedingly important objectives in their own right. 
A retum' to economic growth· ought to be pursued for many reasollS, but 
aIs o because prosperity is a direct determinant of our políticaI and financiaI 
ability to support defence budgets. 
But, . also in a more subtle way, there are connections between economic 
strength and n~tional security. Rapid technological advance, a sizeable po-
pulationof research-oriented scientists and engineers, and large numbers 
of technologically advanced business firms help to generate rapid economic 
growth and at the same time provide the research capability ,essential for 
defence in the mQdern world. But it is the research and technology rather 
than the economic growth itself which contributes to military capability. 
Our economies do not need a large defence budget in order to promote 
and maintaitÍ prosperity. In the post-1945 decades, full employment and 
prosperify have not depended upon large budget outlays for defence. Nor 
wilI this be thecase in the future. There is no law of nature or economics 
which says that nien and women producing arms must produce' those arms 
andnothing' else~Of course~ if defence procurement is reduced, the demand 
for other goods and services'~ publicand private - must be correspondingly 
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increased to provide civilian employment for those formerIy producing 
weapons. 
People are employed only if there is a market for the goods and services 
they produce. But we have - under normal, lowinflation circumstances 
- at our disposal monetary and fiscal instruments which can stimulate 
demand for nondefence goods, thereby increasing the demand for labour 
in an amount suffícient to absorb those laid off in defence establischments. 
N ecessarily there would be transition problems. But, cutbacks in defence 
procurements or low growth of defence spending are no excuse for an overall 
increase in unemployment. 
We can have a decent degree of employment - once the worId economy 
gcts back on a track of sustained moderate economic growth - with any 
size defence budget. Making and buying weapons is not essential to. the po-
tential prosperity of market-economies. The size of the defence budget can 
and should be determined on the basis of defence needs, not as a job-sup-
porting program for putting people to work or keeping companies alive. How 
rapidly we change the defen.ce budgets, up or down, does, of course, affect 
the character of the problem in devising adequate economic policies. But 
in the final analysis, we should see the problem precisely as an economic 
policy problem which requires advance planning and not as a rationalisation 
for proposing excessively large defence budgets. 
Leaving aside in this lecture the very important problem of the depen-
dency on the steady supply of a number of vital raw materiaIs, which is of 
a different nature and size for the US as compared to most other democracies, 
I would for a moment want to focus on the relevanoe of defence policy for 
the conduct of our economic relationships with other nations. Part:cularIy 
the economic relationships between Western Europe, the United States, 
Canada and Japan seem to me an essential e:ement of any national security 
policy. Now, of course, the cop.cept of national security does not lend itself 
to neat and precise Iormu~atjon, ccrtainly not by an economist. It deals, as 
I understand it, w:th a widc variety of risks about whose probabilities 
we have little knowledgc and of contingenc:es whose nature we can: only 
dimly p~rceive. Yet, in dealing with the question of how domestic and in-
ternational economic relationships affect national security, it is impossible 
to avoid at least seme discussion of wilat we mean by the term itself. 
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Clearly, to many people at least, national security does not consist 
simply in providing the military forces needed to deter or to defeat a direct 
threat to the, territorial integrity of their own country only and to preserve 
it against physical domination by another power. A calculation of the armed 
forces directly nceded to meet this objective would reveal the possibility of 
slashing the defence budget very sharply indeed in the United States, whiIe 
it would reveal also that \Vestern Europe and Japan would need very large 
increas~s In their defence budgets. 
Again. clearIy, there still seems to be wide consensus among people in 
the Alliancc and Japan - with increasing and deplorable differences oÍl 
specifics - that in some way or the other our countries have basic national 
security interests which extend beyond the guarantee of our own territorial 
integrity. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of precision and simplicity in 
public decision making those interests revolve principally around intangibles, 
uncertaintics and probabilities rather than aroud sufficiently concrete threats 
readily forseeable and easily grasped. 
Several facts about the postwar worId - and more particularly the world 
as it can be projected over the next ten years - themselves suggest.· the 
nature of our countries, broader and interdependent national security con-
cems. First, the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons and vehicles to 
deliver them across national boundaries is well in the grasp of an increasing 
number of nations. That should make democracies stick close together. 
Second, contrary to the fint postwar decades, now not onIy the United 
States but also Japan, Western Europe, China and the Soviet Union each 
possess a major industrial base, though partIy in stagnation at presente Those 
interdependent industrial bases provide the raw m·aterial from which both 
war and peace can be made; another reasou for the industrial democracies 
to stick together. Third, most of history teaches that there is nothing inhe-
rently stable in the relationships among world powers. Given the awesome 
potential for mutuaI destruction, coordination of as many as possibIe 
countries, national security concerns seems logical. 
The core of US policy, accepted even by most of its most vigorous 
critics in the democratic world, rests on the concept of the United States 
as a guarantor of the security of Western Europe and Japan. The two chief 
rationales for that policy are, as I see them: (1) domination of either Japan 
or Western Europe by a hostile power would threaten US security, and 
(2) without the US guarantee, competitive arms would be set off and 
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the world would become a much more dangerous place, with the risk of 
major wars substantially increased. 
Acceptance of these two propositions implies sOn'le iihportant conse-
quences about how the United States, Canada, Western Europe and Japan 
must conduct their international economic policies. Thearrangements 
whereby the position rif the United States on security mattets'is first among 
equals wiIl endure only so long as its aIlies trust the US to use' power wisely 
At the same time, rapid economic growth among the industrial, nations has 
made them almost equals to the United States in the area of world trade 
and monetary affairs. In the normal course of events, disputes and tensions 
about economic matters arise, many of which have major domestic political 
implications in the nations involved - energy supplies, agricultural prices, 
tariffs quotas, jobs and the like. How these disputes are handled inevitably 
has an impact on the underlying trust and confidence which countries have 
. ;--. 
in each other's behaviour. 
If one of the major partners involved and commited in the arrangements 
for our interdependent national security system uses its economic power on 
a unilateral, basis to extract short-term economic gains, why should other 
nations oot begin to believe that this will also be done in the polítical and 
military arena. A major nation can, if it wishes, throw its weight around 
through unilateral actions and often gain some immediate trading advantages. 
For any nation, this is a dangerous game in a relatively normal period of 
economic growth; its success depends on the good sense and restraint of 
the trading partners. In:·a period of slump, as we are now experiencing, jt 
is very dangerous. Once retaliation starts, the whole world trading system 
is in jeopardy. Unfortunately we do, right now, continue to face the grave 
risk of a breakdown of the world's economic system. However, this is no! 
the right pIace to address that issue. I would only want to remark that all 
democratic countries carry a heavy responsability here in the trade-games 
we are playing. But, for the United States and the EEC it is a doubIy dan-
gerous gam·e. It is after alI a risk to the trust which other nations pIace in 
the rôle of the United States in the political and military arena and of ~the 
EEC in the economic field, which in turn is criticaI to national security 
arrangements of alI democracies. 
This then brings me to a specific set of issues, best described as the 
Three Per Cent Solution and Burden-Sharing. 
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THE THREE PER CENT SOLUTION AND BURDEN-SHARING 
In the late 1970s, as in the early 1950s, ear1y 1960s, and ear1y 1970s, 
the United States began pushing its European allies to increase their defence 
spending in order to enhance NATO's conventional capabilities. The aesign 
to achieve this was the 15-year Long Term Defence Plan (LTDP). The 
catchword was «three per cent real growth» in each member's defence budget 
each year. This policy was and is intended to deal with an admittedly sig-
nificant increase in Russia's qualitative and quantitative improvement of 
her forces deployed along the central front. Almost as an addendum to this 
massive effort, a Task Force was set up to look at the state of NATO's 
tactical nuclear forces. When I, relatively an outsider, first encountered this 
bit of recent history' I was rather surprised. It turns out that the Carter 
Administration did so in order to avoid raising Europe's fears about the 
degradation of the nuclear deterrent that usually arises when they push for 
a conventionaI build-up. As I understand it, this Task Force, number 10, 
was a political afterthought as much as anything eIse. But part of its efforts 
evolved into the High LeveI Group (the HLG), which developed the rationale 
for the modernization of NATO's long range theater nuclear forces. If I 
read current history right it is then important to note here that the Ame-
ricans' intent from the outset was to huild up N ATO's conventional forces, 
not her nuclear ones. The latter decision came reIuctantly from the United 
States only after Europeans pushed hard for some type of American response 
to the SS-20. The 'familiar pattern was repeated: America pushed for COll-
ventional defences; Europe countered with a nuclear request. Whether the 
latter would have occurred wlthout the presence of the SS-20 and soIely 
because of the former is anyone's guess. But if the past be any guide to 
the present, surely the two are not unrelated. 
In assessing the current dispute over the conventional build-up, many 
questions should be asked. Among them are both the questions of the degree 
of conventional disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces and the 
question about Soviet intentions. I am not qualified to answer these two 
questions and will focus solely on a related and very important issue: what 
issues are involved in the relative sharing of the burden between the United 
States and her NATO partners? 
With merit, one could argue that the weakening in NATO's conventional 
forces was due to American, not European action. Various unclassified data 
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support this view. America gutted her NATO-based forces in order to help 
fight the Vietnam War. She drew down her troups in Europe by over 
100.000 and removed valuable noncommissloned officers and material. It 
is interesting to note that in roughly the same period the Iarger members 
of the Alliance - especially France and the Federal Republic of Germany 
-increased their real defence expeditures throughout the years 1971-1978 
by nearly three per cent. The available dataon defence expenditure also 
show that the British, French, Dutch andWest Germans have been doing 
reasonably weU since NATO formally adopted the LTDP in 1977. Surely, 
overall not as well as the United States would like, but not badly, especially 
ir one keeps in mind that the Europeans in general throughout the 1970s 
increased their defence in real terms whereas the United States did noto 
It is, I would suggest, the trend over the last ten years, not departures 
from a fixed goal in any one year or two, that counts. 
Europe's share of NATO's combined defence expenditures has increased 
from around 23 per cent to alm.ost 42 per cent over a ten-year period. Over 
thisperiod from 1969-1979 Eutope's defence exp~nditures have remained 
constant as a percentage of GDP, throughout this period, while America's 
defence expenditures declined. 
A word of caution should be introduced here. Europe has been doÍng 
more relative to the United States, but the Uniter States still bears, by gross 
dollar figures and by the percentages derived there'from, the lion's share 
of NATO defence expenditures. However, a" little bit more refined analysis 
shows that the United States from 1969-1979 decreased its contribution "to 
NATO measured by defence dollars as a percentage of GDP devoted to 
NATO and also whcn measured by the total US defence dollars devoted 
to NATO as a percentage of total NATO defence spending. 
One way of estiIí1ating what the United States spend for NA TO is 
extracting the deience dollars spent on American forces in the Far East. 
This exercise, which is debatable, was done by the US Defence Department 
in the Spring of 1981 (and later again, but those results are, as I underStánd 
them, not different). As I already said, this kind of"exercise is debatable. 
But that is one of the points I would like to make here. Some may argue 
that defence of the Far East is defence of the West because security 1S 
indivisible. Others may argue that security is divisible" because America has 
fought twb "wars in the Far East without one having broken out in Europe. 
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Others again will counter that no war broke out in Europe because America 
fought in the Par East.And still others will argue that the last war in the 
Far East was ill conceived and was funded in party by NATO. Mea[uring 
burden-sharing remains· amystery game. 
At the levei' ofmacro figures, the debate on the relative sharing of the 
burden is inconc1usive. It must be because there are various other measures 
than only defence outlays as a percentage of GDP, which must be considered 
in order to fairly evaluate allied contributions. 
Secretary of Defence;Weirrberger mentioned these other burden-sharing 
measures two years 'agô in a report to the 'Congresso Examples are: 
(1 ) NATO allies mai,ntain on active duty about 3 million menand Won1en 
as compared with, about 2 million for the US and 250.000 Jor Japan. 
Including the reserves with specific assignments after:rnobilization, 
the allied total is over 6 million compared with 3 million for the US. 
(2) The.GDP of alI the non-US NATO nations combined represe~ts 
around 450"0 of NATO and Japan total but non-US NATO account 
for over 60 ero of total NATO and Japan grouad combat capability 
and around 550/0 of the tactical air force combat aircraft. 
(3) Most of the Europ;!an nations obtain their manpower through cons-
cr:ption. If allied defence manpower costs reflected their true civil 
sector opportunity costs, the value of non-US NATO de'fence con-
tributions would be Iargcr than they appear with conscription costs. 
(4) NO:lm·ilitary economic assistance to underdeveloped countries is not 
included in the NATO definition of defence spending. NevertheIess, 
it is considered by a number of European allies and Japan, less though 
by the United States, as an important share of their contribution 
to wor!d security and stability. Norway and the· Netherlands spend 
cIose to 1 per cent of GDP for Official DeveIopment Assistance 
while the US ranks much Iower with onIy. 2per cent of GDP devoted 
to foreign economic assistance. 
These factors temper the apparent inequity in the GDP percentagc for 
defence comparison. With this problem in mind the, US Department of 
Def~nse devised a number of índices of burden-sharing and 'an overall asses-
sment. Secretary of Defense Weinberger reported to Congress in March 1981 
that this approach can give a better perspective of burden-sharing than' any 
109 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
one individual indicator. And he added: «Using this formulation, the ag-
gregated NATO allies appear to be shouldering their fair .share of the total 
NATO and Japan defence burden.» This conclusion is, as I infer from 
remarks by some US politicians, not yet a common good shared by many 
in the United States with their present Secretary of Defense. 
Back now to the Three Per eent Solution. As Secretary Weinberger 
has already pointed out, we may be at a point where the burden-sharing 
pendulum is beginning to swing in the opposite direction. For example, US 
real increases for 1980 and 1981 have, if I looked at the right data, been 
on the order of 3 and 4 per cent compared with non-US NATO increases 
of, probably, on average around 3 per eent in 1980 and mueh lower in 1981. 
Without denying the reIevance of these recent figures it must be stressed 
here that the Three Per eent yardstick created misunderstandings due to 
dubious by-products of financiaI fixation. This was well understood by the 
defence ministers o'f the Eurogroup who in December 1980 emphasized that 
what mattered were «the results aehieved in terms of improving manpower, 
equipment and overall readiness». 
Three Per Cent yardstickexit then? No, -this has not been the case 
because political capital has been invested in this 'pledge, especially, but not 
onIy it seems, in the United States. Defence establishments and politicians 
would, however, be well-advised if they got rid of a yardstiek which does 
not address the basic burden-sharing questions. True, the Three Per Cent 
pledge may prevent free-riders from too little contribution to the common 
tasks. But if kept for too long it risks the treatment given by politicians to 
primitive supply-side economics: once taken serious it can do real damage. 
This brings me to the last part of my remarks which deals with defenee 
and recession. 
DEFENCE AND RECESSI01V 
As indicated before there is, as yet, no c1ear indication that current 
defence budgets have been seriously affected 'by the dangerous economic 
recession of the past few years. Surely different countries have reaeted 
differently in both spending and in planning for defence budgets. But to 
the best of my knowledge, defence spending has in most democratic nations 
so far not really been slashed beca use of economic slack. Rather other 
considerations may slowly be affeeting the basic positions, especially in-
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vestment in hardware. Thesc other considerations have everytbing to do 
with polítical values and the settingof national prlorities. Such development 
is, I would suggest here, rather serious and requires careful analyses and 
discussion. 
As I perceive the setting of priorities in some European countries today, 
the . debate about future defence budgets stands out alone in not getting 
much public attention. This differs, of course, from country to country, but 
especially the smaller countries and one or two Iarger ones do experience 
in almost total political silence that the perplexing problems facing the 
Atlantic Alliance may carry a price for defence budgets. 
However, at the same time within Westem Europe dissent over present 
day security policies is being voiced as neverbef9re~ most obviously' with 
respect to the rôle of nuclear weapons .. EuroPean . qúestioning of some of 
the assumptions underlying aspects of current allied policy and posture niay 
not be easi1y accommodated. ' 
This also relates to the management of Western economies which is proving 
problematical. Mustering the resources to maintain \Vestern defence efforts 
se,ems likely to get more rather tban less difficult as time goes by. Indeed, 
it seems necessary to point out that the continued willingness of all European 
NATO members to find the money - and the manpower and material- to 
sustain the apparatus for deterrence and defence as at present conceived 
and organized must be in doubt. The partial fulfillment of the Three Per 
Cent pledge, so far at least, is usually and rightly considered a good sign, 
though is would be better if it were accompanied by an annuaI 3 per ceot 
increase in efficiency. 
It is, however, questionable whether, assuming continuing Iack of eco-
no'rilic growth, it can be expected that resources will continue to be allocated 
in'line with· the security needs of the Atlantic Alliance and Japan. 
Talking to expert commentators in Europe, I have found that they 
probably agree that finding the money to keep NATO's order of battle up 
to strength and up to standard throughout the 1980s is a politically tough 
task. Many point out that the job will be harder if, to allay disquiet about 
the rôle assigned to nuclear weapons, governments feeI, quite rationally, 
impelled to attempt. some enhancement of capabilities for conventional 
warfare. 
Essentially, the problem is twofold.· In the first place, defence ministries 
face the prospect o'f getting Iess defence for their money year-by-year, because 
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of the rising real cost of military manpower and material. In the second 
place, the likelihood is that finance ministers will not be inclined to allocate 
more money for defence year after year. And certainly not sufficiently 
more to compensate for both general inflation and the tendency Ior the cost 
of military item-s to rise faster than the ovcrall price leveI. In this connection 
it is worth noting here that, in practice, annual budget increments of even 
5 per cent in real terms are what armed forces appear to need to maintain 
capabilities at existing leveIs; they do not buy actual improvements. 
Now, any high-school student will remark new technoIogies ought, at 
least in theory, to offer relief from the «less defence for your money» pre-
dicament so far as expenditure on equipment is concerned. However, as I 
understand it, an important impulse in military circles is to exploit techno-
Iogy for the provision of more cffective ways of doing whatever is being 
done at the moment and not to discover cheaper ways of achieving the 
cu~ent leveI of performance. Pay-offs from technical progress in the form 
of cost-rcduction, such as are experience::l in civil fields are not enjoyed to 
anything like the same extent in the defence field. AlI this means that, over 
time, for given or slowly rising real spending, we shall get less and less in 
terms of the usual indices of defence capabilities. Less defence for your 
money thcrefore. 
And, worse, if the Soviet Union continues its huge increases in real 
defence spending, the conventional balance will not get better but rather 
worse. However, asking for more than a, say 2-3 per cent real annual increase 
across NATO-Europe does not, at present, seem realistic. Priorities are not 
with defence but rather with social programs, unemployment benefits, educa-
tion, infrastructure, lame-duck companies, subsidizing agriculture and with 
reaIlocation of resources to get back on the path to sustained economic 
growth. In fact, it seems to me that trying to increase defence budgets at the 
expense of. social and economic priorities may very weIl boomerang unless 
there is c1ear, televised evidence that the Americans are going and/or the 
Russians coming. That would be Iate. 
[In passing, I would like to mention here that a great potential for 
employment and efficlency should be considered through a common European 
defence industry. Production could be spread around Europe. This does 
not require grand new design but a practical approach to a European share 
in aIlied arm purchasing.] 
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CONCLUSION 
In May 1982, Henry Kissinger remarked in a speech in The Hague 
(Holland): «Existing trends may sometimes appear bleak, but let us not 
forget that they are the result of decisions by free societies and can therefore 
be reversed by free decisions.» This view certainly applies to the domestic 
consensus required for adequate defence spending even in periods of eco-
nomic _ stagnation. 
Unless we are willing to admit what the trouble is, we are not likely 
to find the solution. Part of that trouble is, in economists' jargon, exogeneous 
to defence establishments, e. g., the world economy and the Soviet Union. 
Another part is endogeneous, e. g., defence management and ease-to-grasp 
basic policies, intellectually accessible to the electorate. To me, a non-expert 
in military matters, one conclusion then stands out: tensions and economic 
stagnation make alliances more rather than less necessary. This being so, 
democratic nations would serve their people by continuously acknowledging 
that in the face of recession a mutually cost1y and hazardous process of 
military spending is a favour to none of the countries in the world. 
But, as a final word Mr. Chairman, probably the situation was always 
a bit like this: it is like looking down different ends of a telescope. Both 
distort reality. Things are not as bad as they seem now and they were not 
alI that great before. 
Victor Halberstadt 
Professor of Public Financc 
in Layden University 
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